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Introduction 
As the Arab Spring sent shockwaves across North 
Africa, the Western governments reached out to Indo-
nesia for guidance, viewing the country with the larg-
est Muslim population as an ideal model for the “Arab 
Spring” countries. The Obama administration turned to 
Jakarta to make sense of the events raging across the 
region, and to forge a trajectory of change that would 
bring these countries to where Indonesia had ended 
up. Indeed, it was the conviction of many, including the 
then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, that the 
uprisings echoed what had transpired in Indonesia in 
the 1990s, when the country transformed itself from a 
dictatorship under Suharto into a functioning democ-
racy.1
Having passed through similar stages earlier, Indo-
nesia has a democratic regime that still balances with 
success the dynamics of Islam, secularism and de-
mocracy. The democratic phase for Indonesia started 
in May 1998, when the residents of Jakarta took to the 
streets to protest against heavy political repression, 
corruption and the economic setbacks engendered by 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Soon thereafter, Indonesia 
embarked upon its journey from authoritarian rule to a 
democratic regime.
After General Suharto stepped down in 1999, the au-
thoritarian structure of this government became decon-
structed into a decentralized administrative system: it 
now distributes authority between the People’s Consul-
tative Assembly, the president and the judicial branch 
at the top, and empowers local levels of civil society 
along the periphery.2 This new structure therefore has 
peeled away from the excessive power vested in Ja-
karta and increased local participation in the polity.3
Another laudable facet of the post-Suharto Indonesia 
became the reduction of the sociopolitical role of the 
armed forces. Much like the leader of the every Arab 
Spring state, General Suharto, too, had relied on the 
backing of the military to remain firmly anchored in 
power.4 A constitutional amendment of 2004 deprived 
the military of the bloc of seats in the House of Repre-
sentatives traditionally cordoned off for its elite – which 
led the armed forces to surrender their supremacy in 
favour of civilian rule and eventually withdraw back into 
the barracks.
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In comparison to other South Asian states, Indone-
sia furthermore has an enviable record of a peaceful 
handover of government to the opposition. The last two 
Malaysian presidents, for instance, have jailed their 
predecessors; one-party communist rule has been in 
effect in Vietnam since its unification; and Thailand’s 
President still claims to draw its legitimacy from por-
traying himself as the sole protector of the monarchy. 
In contrast, Indonesia’s most recent elections in April 
2014 witnessed 140 million people at the ballot-box 
(75% turn-out), followed by a smooth transition of pow-
er with every candidate accepting the results gracefully, 
including the former President Yudhoyono who did not 
turn to the men in uniform.5
Over the course of past three decades, Suharto’s 
authoritarianism then became replaced by a system 
based on political inclusiveness, free and fair elections 
that comply with the “Western” standards, reduction in 
the political role of the military, and an incorporation 
of Islamist organizations into the political spectrum in 
a way that enhanced democratic development – all of 
which are viewed by the “Western world” as the hall-
marks of a genuine democracy.6 Their request was that 
Indonesia provided a template of actions and meas-
ures, which could then be effectively applied to steer 
the North African states out of their quagmire and to-
wards the world of parliamentary democracies.
This paper deals with how Indonesia reflected upon its 
own experiences and responded to these calls for guid-
ance. It will analyze Indonesia’s foreign policy under 
both Yudhoyono and his successor Jokowi, and ex-
trapolate the overarching themes that are woven into 
Jakarta’s relations with the Arab World. Analysts are 
often quick to “make too much” of Jakarta’s  bebas aktif 
foreign policy – a “free and active” approach to interna-
tional relations that champions activism on the world-
stage. As this study will suggest, this commitment to 
activism is often narrowly defined in terms of military 
involvement. Many also disregard the multiple aspects 
of Jakarta’s foreign policy that weigh heavily upon its 
stance vis-à-vis the Arab World, chief amongst which is 
the principle of non-interference. If examined through 
these vantage points, it will come to the fore
that Indonesia has indeed honoured the obligations 
2of its  bebas aktif  policy – albeit in the form of soft-power 
activism. In view of Indonesia’s geographic isolation, 
the decision-makers weighed the merits of entangle-
ment, and hesitated to become sucked into a series 
of events, from which the country could not derive any 
political or economic benefits. Instead, Jakarta wield-
ed clout through the less transparent, albeit forceful, 
channels of lobbying that allowed Indonesia to engage 
“great powers” on initiatives without necessarily align-
ing with anyone.
The policy of “bebas-aktif”
In a speech on September 2, 1948, Indonesia’s first 
Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta laid out the key 
tenets that would constitute the basic premises of Ja-
karta’s foreign policy.7 As encapsulated in the phrase 
“bebas-aktif,” Hatta’s policy would lend emphasis to an 
“independent and free” Indonesia on the world-stage. 
It included a commitment to anti-colonialism, pursu-
ing a line of action of consonant with the country’s do-
mestic and international interests, and having absolute 
freedom in shaping policy without foreign meddling.8 
As Hatta said in his speech, “Indonesia should be an 
independent agent, entitled to determine its own stand-
point in a world that was becoming more intensely po-
larized.” 9
This line is indeed important, for it elucidates the main 
drivers behind creating a  bebas and  aktif Indonesia. 
In the early years of the Cold War, this policy identi-
fied Indonesia’s place in the global political system that 
was quickly becoming polarized around American and 
Soviet power-blocs. Simply put, it registered Indone-
sia’s refusal to side with anyone. It was also meant to 
silence the contending voices amongst the policy-elite, 
who had contrasting opinions on what role Indonesia 
should play as member of the international community. 
Hatta’s foreign policy thus prevented the ideological 
rivalry between the United States and Russia from 
exploiting the tension at the executive level.10  In this 
sense, it served to protect Indonesian sovereignty, en-
sure the security of its borders – and perhaps more 
significantly, maintain national unity at a time when the 
country could have easily slipped under either sphere 
of influence.  
Although the “bebas-aktif” approach to international re-
lations should have kept Indonesia non-aligned and not 
linked up with a superpower, the country was still closer 
to the US in the immediate aftermath of independence,
demonstrated through the signing of a Mutual Security 
Act (MSA) in 1952.11 An analysis of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy from the 1950s through to 1980s suggests
that Jakarta lent more emphasis to independence, rath-
er than activism in the earlier years of this policy’s ex-
ecution: for instance, Indonesia’s 8th  Prime Minister Ali 
Sastroamidjojo established ties with the Soviet Union 
in 1954 and organized an Afro-African conference in 
Bandung in April 1955.12  By contrast, the 1980s would 
witness an Indonesia assuming more active roles on 
the regional stage. It restored diplomatic ties with Chi-
na in August 1990; chaired the non-Aligned Movement 
between 1992 and 1995; and hosted the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in November 
1994.13 As this very brief overview indicates,  bebas and 
aktif  would remain the key tenets of Indonesian foreign 
policy, and the incumbents would determine how  in-
dependent and  active Jakarta would be, in light of the 
country’s changing national objectives and security 
threats both in the region and the wider global context. 
Foreign policy under Yudhoyono and Jokowi
In his 2005 speech to the Indonesian Council for World 
Affairs, Yudhoyono said he would pursue a “con-
structive approach to international relations, engage 
regional and global actors, and serve as a mediator, 
peacekeeper and confidence builder.”14 His maxim was 
“a million friends and no enemies,” in view of which the 
President shaped the country’s foreign policy. In order 
to make “a million friends,” Indonesia was keen to work 
within the international milieu; to maintain “zero ene-
mies,” it would keep silent in disputes of global scale 
and not run the risk of alienating anyone. 
At the turn of the century, the new President stated his 
willingness to assume a more significant role in the 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
Yudhoyono furthermore increased the country’s level 
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At the turn of the century, the new 
President stated his willingness 
to assume a more significant role 
in the ASEAN.
of participation in numerous regional organizations, 
such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
Southwest Pacific Dialogue (SwPD) and Asian 
Cooperation dialogue (ACD). He also launched the 
Asian Defense Ministers Meeting, and partook in 
discussions that culminated in the organization of the 
3promulgated as to share Indonesia’s experience. At the 
same time, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, in his capacity as 
the deputy-speaker of People’s Consultative Assembly, 
confirmed Jakarta’s role as a mediator, stating that the 
Parliament looked favorably upon Indonesia’s activism 
in steering Egypt towards a more democratic future. 
Indonesia also partook in a US-led “mission for peace 
and understanding” in February 2012, which included 
training sessions and seminars with political and civil 
leaders in Egypt and Tunisia.19
It is often overlooked, however, that Yudhoyono’s 
statements were always impregnated with cautious 
rhetoric: the President stated multiple times, and would 
be prompted to comment again in July 2013 in reaction 
to the deadly clashes between Morsi and the Egyptian 
military, “[Indonesia is] not advising Egypt, [they] do not 
have a recipe.”20 Yudhoyono furthermore refrained from 
providing any technical assistance for the ouster of 
Mubarak in 2011, and made it clear that Indonesia was 
not in a position to “lecture” the rebels on how to realize 
their objectives. Similarly throughout the Syrian crisis, 
Indonesia reiterated its will to see Assad surrender his 
power in favour of a leadership accepted by all Syrian 
parties, yet did not follow this up with substantive ac-
tion.21 It even abstained from voting on a UNGA Reso-
lution condemning the Assad regime in May 2013; it 
disagreed with the decisions to recognize the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forc-
es as the interlocutor, asserting that “these resolutions 
contained elements that ran counter to international 
law,” such as an unwarranted intervention into Syria’s 
internal affairs.22  It should be noted that, although Ja-
karta might have voted in favour of the previous UNGA 
Resolution on Syria in 2012, this had only called for 
cessation of hostilities and promotion of stability – not 
for the dispatch of any armed forces or authorities.23 
This policy of non-intervention also serves some “self-
ish” objectives. Like that of every other country, there 
are parts of its track record that Indonesia would rather 
keep unexposed. One of them is its human rights re-
cord. In this respect, not playing an active role on the 
world-stage allows Jakarta to avoid criticism. Indonesia 
has even refused to ratify the Rome Statute of Interna-
tional Criminal Court, so as not to expose the country to 
unwanted attention. This allowed Jakarta to keep away 
international lawyers, who would otherwise have se-
verely reprimanded the authorities for the human rights 
violations committed in East Timor in 1976.24
East Asia Summit, where all powers pledged to work 
together towards regional security. In his capacity as 
a participant at the G20 Summit, the President also 
“proposed initiatives in multilateral development bank 
reform and assistance for emerging markets during 
global crises.”15  Under his supervision in 2012, Jakarta 
attempted to broker an end to the conflict along the 
Thailand/Cambodian border, and tried to break through 
the diplomatic impasse over disputes between states 
surrounding the South China Sea.16
Many assumed that these early developments would 
have triggered an unstoppable wave of international 
roles. This wave, however, ran on certain undercur-
rents that shaped its overall direction: although willing 
to address problems of democracy, Yudhoyono’s for-
eign policy remained rooted in non-alignment and neu-
trality. For instance, the chief purpose of the Bali De-
mocracy Forum, which Indonesia launched in 2008 for 
the Asia-Pacific countries, was to discuss the concepts 
and skills required for peace-building and peacekeep-
ing through international exchanges, joint missions and 
network building. As many have misinterpreted, this did 
not suggest that Jakarta would deploy troops or per-
sonnel to supervise or preside over a country’s transi-
tion to democracy.
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This policy of non-intervention 
also serves some “self-ish” 
objectives.
Yudhoyono also agreed to co-chair the UNSC high-lev-
el panel on post-2015 development agenda, and intro-
duced an intergovernmental commission on the human 
rights under the auspices of the ASEAN.17  This branch, 
nonetheless, functions merely as a consultative body 
and is devoid of any legal mechanisms to enforce any 
regulations – affording Indonesia the necessary meas-
ures to keep together its neutrality.
For Indonesia, then, espousing a “free and active” 
policy meant promoting human rights and democratic 
governance with a soft touch. It seemed more than will-
ing to offer guidance, yet exercised precaution towards 
assisting a country’s efforts to realize these objectives. 
This would weigh heavily on Indonesia’s stance vis-à-
vis the Arab Springs and characterize its foreign policy, 
when The Foreign Minister Natalegawa travelled to 
Cairo in April 201118 The official purpose of this trip was 
4Staying away from any extreme 
measures of involvement then 
helps Indonesia avoid a break 
in friendly relations with the 
international community.
en to the post of Governor of Jakarta in 2012.26  These 
factors have led Jokowi to portray himself more as a 
“domestic reformer than an international statesmen.”27
 
According to Jokowi, courting the global spotlight will 
not be a priority. The Foreign Ministry, however, is likely 
present a major obstacle in this regard, as Indonesian 
diplomats have continued in their positions from the 
Yudhoyono era and are therefore staunch advocates 
of an internationalist outlook.28 The Ministry is therefore 
not to be lulled into a state of slumber, and at least 
throughout the formative years of the Jokowi admin-
istration, will continue to function as an engine of pro-
active diplomacy  a la Yudhoyono. The future trajectory 
of Indonesia’s foreign relations then remains unclear. 
Keeping in mind that Jokowi will have to balance his 
own interests with those of the Foreign Ministry, the 
President may confine the sphere of his policy vision to 
regional parameters. This way, he will have appeased 
the ambitions of his diplomats as well as addressed re-
gional issues that are connected to domestic troubles.
 
The lack of a former career in politics could also work 
to Jokowi’s advantage. With no links to the military or 
the Suharto leadership, he could end the “tradition” of 
political horse-trading with the ruling coalition; he even 
promised during the campaign trail that he would form 
a “cabinet of experts” that had the public’s best inter-
ests at heart, instead of appointing strong politicians 
that pursued their own agenda.29  This will allow Jokowi 
to follow a foreign policy largely free from the manipula-
tion of the older elite; instead of moving ahead with an 
internationalist worldview, he will then have a chance 
to restrict Indonesia’s activism to its neighbourhood.30 
He has already taken steps to this end, grappling, for 
instance, with the issue of around 5,000 ships that op-
erate illegally in Indonesian waters. Settling maritime 
border disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia, and 
enhancing the protection of Indonesian workers abroad 
are both laudable goals to this end.31 As the situation 
currently stands, therefore, the Middle East is not likely 
to appear on Jokowi’s agenda.
Indonesia’s response to the ISIS and rising 
fundamentalism
This is not to suggest, however, that Jokowi will be 
against cooperation per se , or will eschew the possibil-
ity of alignment with a “great power,” should it serve its 
national interest.  On 30 October 2014, the commander 
of Indonesia’sArmed Forces, General Moeldoko, told 
a public lecture in Singapore that the regional forces 
Breaking neutrality could also harm economic relations 
with Indonesia’s regional partners. As will be discussed 
more in depth below, the country’s economy is almost 
dependent upon trade with China, and adopting a 
raucous tone when addressing such topics as human 
rights and protection of sovereignty has the potential of 
fracturing the economic ties. For instance, Indonesia’s 
self-appropriated role as a mediator in the region, and 
its disapproving stance vis-à-vis China’s violation of 
territorial rights in the South China Sea, has generated 
a lingering sense of distrust between Jakarta and 
Beijing; should this manifest into active involvement, it 
is very likely to draw Beijing’s ire and produce negative 
ramifications for the former’s economy.25
Staying away from any extreme measures of involve-
ment then helps Indonesia avoid a break in friendly 
relations with the international community. By virtue 
of its geographical distance from the epicenter of the 
Arab Spring, Indonesia would not be directly affected 
by the outcome of the Libyan civil war or by the fate 
of the governments in Cairo and Tunisia; it also does 
not have any interest in influencing the revolutionary 
changes underway in Syria towards a certain direction. 
The fact that Indonesia had nothing to obtain from the 
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outcome of these struggles encouraged the authorities 
to keep together their unwillingness to force events on 
the ground. Accordingly, Yudhoyono opted in favour of 
wielding soft power by providing guidance on how to 
successfully manage a democratic transition, instead 
of displaying hard power by actually assisting this tran-
sition step-by-step.
His successor Joko Widodo’s, or more affectionately 
known as Jokowi, inauguration as the new President 
on 20 October 2014 ushered in a new dawn for the 
Foreign Ministry. What sets him apart from his prede-
cessor is that he lacks a membership amongst Jakar-
ta’s elite and does not have a military pedigree. Before 
he put his name down on the presidential ticket, he had 
served as the mayor of Surakarta in 2005 and had ris-
should consolidate their efforts to counter the extrem-
ist threat from ISIS.32  Jakarta has also been keen to 
cooperate with Washington to tackle the ISIS threat; 
General Moeldoko had even asked Martin Dempsey, 
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, if Indonesia’s 
senior commanders could partake in the meetings of 
Washington’s anti-IS taskforce.33  In another remark-
able shift in policy, Indonesia signed a Defense Coop-
eration Agreement with Saudi Arabia in January 2014 
to forge a joint exercise on counter-terrorism.34
This, however, does not suggest that Indonesia is now 
advancing into deepening commitment on the world 
stage. The caveat is that, in addition to being a global 
phenomenon, the threat of Islamic extremism is also a 
domestic concern. In July 2014, a video titled “Join the 
Ranks” in the Bahasa language featured a militant clad 
in the black ISIS uniform, calling on Indonesian to join 
the Caliphate. It is estimated that roughly 2,000 recruits 
from Indonesia have pledged allegiance to al-Bagh-
dadi’s Islamic State, and allegedly have even formed a 
smaller militant unit, made up of Indonesians and Ma-
laysians, called Katibah Nusantara.35  Many of these re-
cruits are radicalized, young Indonesian Muslims with 
Western passports, who are granted easy access to 
the Levant by virtue of their travel documents. An over-
whelming number of them, it is speculated, have also 
established extensive connections with the existing ter-
rorist cells across Indonesia that have the funds at their 
disposal to cover the militants’ expenses and obtain a 
letter of recommendation from an ISIS member – which 
is apparently a prerequisite for membership.36
It is feared that the veteran softhe Syrian  jihad  might 
launch proxy - war son Indonesian soil upon their re-
turn, provide leadership to incompetent jihadi move-
ments in rural areas and develop these amateur 
fighters into a competent terrorist unit. Abu Wardah 
Santoso, the leader of the East Asian Mujahedin and 
the first Indonesian to swear allegiance to al-Baghdadi, 
is also believed to be operating from a jungle retreat 
on the island of Sulawesi, which has long served 37 
as a hideout for extremists with its remote mountain 
ranges. Unofficially labeled as “the symbolic heart of 
ISIS in Indonesia,” he has serious field experience in 
Indonesia’s most notorious militant outfits – and thus 
the capacity to train footsoldiers for Iraq and Syria.38 
On 19 September 2013, a joint force formed by the po-
lice and Indonesian Military Unit discovered his hiding 
place in the Poso Pesisir district in Poso regency in 
central Sulawesi, but Santoso is still active and yet to 
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In addition to drawing a myriad of 
Indonesian youth into the Syrian 
war, the strengthening link with 
ISIS poses another threat.
be tracked down.39 Now that these cells are also oper-
ating fund-raising campaigns, purportedly for the “final 
showdown” in Syria, they may channel these funds to 
their own coffers, strengthen their resources and inflict 
more peril in Indonesia.40
In addition to drawing a myriad of Indonesian youth into 
the Syrian war, the strengthening link with ISIS poses 
another threat. Indonesia has long been a scene of an-
ti-Christian violence in the region, and the past decade 
has witnessed a proliferation in cases of religiously-
motivated violence: Human Rights Watch, for instance, 
has reported 216 cases of religious attacks in 2010 
and 184 in 2011 through September. These abuses 
persisted throughout Yudhoyono’s presidency and into 
the Jokowi administration: the Jakarta-based Setara 
Institute that monitors religious freedom recorded 230 
attacks on religious minorities in 2013 and 107 cases 
in 2014 through November, targeting the constituents 
of Indonesia’s diverse population, including Christians, 
the Ahmadiyah, Shia Muslims and indigenous faith be-
lievers.41
To be certain, Indonesia’s counter-terrorism unit, Spe-
cial Detachment Unit 88, has launched successful 
crackdowns on suspected militants. Since its formation 
in 2003, the Indonesian security forces have arrested 
more than 700 militants and killed more then 60.42 This 
counter-terrorism unit also arrested 10 militants and 
seized 12 handmade explosives from a group sus-
pected of plotting to blow up the Parliament building in 
August 2012.
It furthermore imprisoned 11 people in September 
2012, implicated in a plot to attack foreign and domes-
tic targets that include high-profile sites, such as the 
US Embassy, the Australian Embassy, and the Jakar-
ta-branch of the American mining company Freeport 
McMoran Copper and Gold. Operating under the aus-
pices of Harakah Sunni for Indonesian Society, these 
extremists had also advanced plans to attack the US 
Consulate in Surabaya and the headquarters of a spe-
cial police force in Java.43
Despite these successes in combatting fundamental-
ism, they are far from curbing either the threat of ter-
rorism or religiously-inspired violence. The authorities 
are therefore worried that, if the fundamentalist cells 
become emboldened through a stronger connection 
with al-Baghdadi’s organization, this may furnish them 
with more confidence to expand the scope of their op-
erations.44 As discussed, Jokowi is likely to throw In-
donesia’s weight behind international efforts to battle 
against ISIS. This, however, will not come through the 
President’s willingness for more commanding pres-
ence on the world-stage, but his efforts to find solutions 
to issues that engender domestic instability.
Prospect for Indonesia in the Middle East: 
Not so bright?
Somewhat aligned with its political objectives, Indo-
nesia’s economy, too, revolves around projects in the 
region. In 2013, for instance, its top 10 trading partners 
were, in sequence of their ranking, China, Japan, Sin-
gapore, European Union, USA, Malaysia, South Korea, 
India, Thailand and Australia – i.e. mostly regional part-
ners.45  Sino-Indonesian trade had already been sub-
stantially strengthened under Yudhoyono, as their mu-
tual trade quadrupled to 66 billion USD between 2005 
and 2013, and investment soared to 2 billion USD.46 
A high-level meeting between China and Indonesia in 
January 2015 furthermore signaled that this approach 
to Sino-Indonesia relations would be much more con-
crete. Jokowi furthermore joined the Chinese-led Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, and agreed to enhance 
cooperation in the field of infrastructure development 
and power plant cooperation.47
In fact, the President has not demonstrated the same 
enthusiasm towards revitalizing economic ties with 
the Arab World. This is not to suggest that none of the 
South Asian countries have explored the benefits of 
entering into financial transactions with its members. 
For example, the UAE Petroleum Investment Company 
invested 6.7 billion USD in an oil storage site in Malay-
sia, while Qatar has conveyed 4 billion USD towards a 
petrochemical project in Vietnam.48  In return, Jakarta 
could invest in the construction sectors in Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar to solve the housing shortage: Riyadh is ex-
pected to need at least 50,000 housing units per year 
for the next years, and has launched a 67 billion USD 
worth project to build 100,000 houses. The cachet is 
the high demand for wooden products, which Indone-
sia is a condition to supply with its 1 billion USD worth 
of exports in timber.49  Towards this market, Jokowi has 
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so far remained unresponsive.
In addition, Indonesia is trying to meet its domestic con-
sumption demand, which grew by 44% between 2002 
and 2012. The declining oil production and the rising 
domestic demand evolved into such a problem that it 
caused the country’s exit from OPEC in 2009.50 Yet, 
this has not yet prompted Jakarta to explore any con-
tracts with the oil-rich Arab Springs countries: a year 
before the uprisings erupted, the five top-ranking coun-
tries on Jakarta’s list of origins of petroleum imports 
included Saudi Arabia (with 36.15% share), with Libya 
and Algeria (as the only Arab Spring countries) rank-
ing as sixth with 2.02% and seventh with 1.75% share, 
respectively.51 In 2012, nearly one-fourth of crude oil 
imports came from Saudi Arabia, followed by Nigeria, 
Azerbaijan, UAE, Qatar and Malaysia.52 
There are a couple of reasons why this might be, first 
of which is the fact that Indonesia does not have any 
linkages with international oil pipelines and a few do-
mestic pipelines – a condition that renders maritime 
trade the most viable option. In this regard, the country 
is dependent on the seaborne trade routes that trans-
port oil shipments to the Asian markets, which are 
currently manipulated by the Persian Gulf suppliers.53 
For Indonesia, the strategic oil-providing countries are 
then Saudi Arabia, Arabian Gulf countries (Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, the UAE and Oman) and countries west of the 
Suez Canal (Libya and Algeria). To strengthen its ties 
with some of these countries, Indonesia has taken a 
few steps.
Relevant in this regard is the business meeting in 
Jeddah on 4 February 2013, which was attended by 
Indonesian and Saudi Arabian business owners. Yud-
hoyono urged the Saudi businessmen to invest in his 
country, especially in energy, minerals and agricultural 
sectors, and welcomed the plan to open an office in 
Jakarta of the Jeddah-based Islamic Development 
Bank.54 Yudhoyono also received the Iranian foreign 
minister Mohammed Zarif and his Indonesian counter-
part Marty Natalegawa in March 2014 to discuss trade 
cooperation. Indonesia’s activism in the region is then 
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For Indonesia, the strategic oil-
providing countries are then Saudi 
Arabia, Arabian Gulf countries and 
countries west of the Suez Canal.
rather trade-indexed; unlike the Muslim countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa, it does not seem too con-
cerned about balancing the Saudi-Iranian dynamics.
Also, the Indonesian government is refocusing its en-
ergy policy by switching its basic source of power to 
coal – an affordable mineral that is also available in 
abundance. Encouraging the use of coal is connected 
to the country’s finances.55 Jokowi has promised to in-
crease electricity supply and outlined a programme to 
deliver 25,000 MW of new power by 2019. Honouring 
this pledge by building power-plants or oil refineries 
does not seem viable; according to PLN, Indonesia’s 
government-owned State Electricity Company, the de-
mand for electricity has increased by 9.4% per annum 
for the past five years and the demand for power will 
double in eight years.56  By contrast, analysts estimate 
that Indonesia produces on average 370 million metric 
tonnes per year; in fact, its coal output reached 425 
million metric tonnes in 2014, and exceeded the total 
demand by 4.9 million tonnes.57  Using coal to generate 
energy then renders at Indonesia’s disposal decades’ 
worth of fuel to power economic growth. This, in return, 
has diminished the need for petroleum supplies, and 
correlatively, a livelier trade with the Arab Spring coun-
tries.
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that Indonesia’s foreign policy 
vis-à-vis the Arab Spring has been characterized by 
prudent activism. It followed a low-profile line of policy 
towards non-pivotal countries. This rendered the revo-
lutionary changes largely irrelevant to Jakarta’s foreign 
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agenda and thus unworthy of “serious” commitments. 
Indonesia does not have its own vision for the Middle 
East, and nor does it try to forge more advantageous 
conditions by changing the political landscape. In re-
turn, its approach towards the Arab World is balanced 
against these realities: since involvement in the messy 
changes underway does not offer any political or finan-
cial benefits, Jakarta is cautious not become entangled 
within the web of responsibilities that accompany hard-
power activism.
Indonesia then wielded soft power as a democratic, 
Muslim country that was willing to share its know-how 
with other Muslim countries in the process of demo-
cratic transformation. Yet in the absence of any con-
cerns to secure a certain outcome, Jakarta did not find 
any value in deploying troops to topple down dictators, 
or dispatching political experts to ensure a successful 
transition. Both Yudhoyono and Jokowi have kept their 
unwillingness to force events on the ground, and con-
veyed their attention towards their immediate neigh-
bourhood – where, unlike the Arab World, they had 
vested interests.
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Indonesia then wielded soft 
power as a democratic, Muslim 
country that was willing to share 
its know-how with other Muslim 
countries in the process of 
democratic transformation.  
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